We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset's realized value. In formal security-bid auctions, the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a standard auction format (e.g., first-or second-price Auction theory and its applications have become increasingly important as an area of economic research over the last 20 years. As a result, we now have a better understanding of how the structure of an auction affects its outcome. Almost all the existing literature studies the case when bidders use cash payments, so that the value of a bid is not contingent on future events.
Auction theory and its applications have become increasingly important as an area of economic research over the last 20 years. As a result, we now have a better understanding of how the structure of an auction affects its outcome. Almost all the existing literature studies the case when bidders use cash payments, so that the value of a bid is not contingent on future events.
In a few cases, such as art auctions, the realized value is subjective and cannot be used as a basis for payment; however, this is the exception. In many important applications, the realization of the future cash flow generated by the auctioned asset or project can be used in determining the actual payment. That is, the bids can be securities whose values are derived from the future cash flow. We call this setting a securitybid auction, and provide an extensive characterization of such auctions.
Formal auctions of this type are commonly used in government sales of oil leases, wireless spectrum, highway building contracts, and leadplaintiff auctions. Informal auctions of this type (in the sense that formal auction rules are not set forth in advance) are common in the private sector. Examples include authors selling publishing rights, entrepreneurs selling their firm to an acquirer or soliciting venture capital, and sports associations selling broadcasting rights.
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The major difference between a formal and an informal mechanism is the level of commitment by the seller. In an informal mechanism, bidders choose which securities to offer, and the seller selects the most attractive offer ex post. In this case, the auction contains the elements of a signaling game because the seller may infer bidders' private information from their security choices when evaluating their offers. In a formal mechanism the seller restricts bidders to use securities from a pre-specified ordered set, such as an equity share or royalty rate. The seller is committed to disqualify any offer outside this set. The seller also commits to an auction format, such as a first-or second-price auction. One of our main results is that the revenues from an informal mechanism are the lowest across a large set of possible mechanisms. In other words, the seller benefits from any form of commitment. Moreover, we show how to rank security designs and auction formats in terms of their impact on the seller's revenues, and that the design of the securities can be more important than design of the auction itself.
In our model, several agents compete for an asset or project that requires an upfront investment. This investment may correspond to an amount of cash that the seller needs to raise, or the resources required to run the project. Bidders observe private signals regarding the value they can expect if they acquire the asset. Our initial structure is similar to an independent private values model, so that different bidders expect different payoffs upon winning, although we also consider correlated and common values. The model differs from standard auction models in that bids are securities. Bidders offer derivatives in which the underlying value is the future payoff of the asset. Because the winner may make investments or take other actions that affect this payoff, we also discuss the possibility of moral hazard.
One might conjecture that the results from standard auction theory carry over to securitybid auctions by simply replacing each security with its cash value. Unlike cash bids, however, the value of a security bid depends upon the bidder's private information. This difference can have important consequences as the following simple example demonstrates:
Consider an auction in which two bidders, Alice and Bob, compete for a project. The project requires an initial fixed investment that is equivalent to $1M (we can interpret some or all of this amount as a minimum up-front cash payment required by the seller). Alice expects that if she undertakes the project, then on average it would yield cash flows of $4M; Bob expects future cash flows of only $3M. Assuming these estimates are private values, in a standard second-price auction it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their reservation values. As a result, Alice would bid 4 Ϫ 1 ϭ $3M and win the auction, paying Bob's bid of 3 Ϫ 1 ϭ $2M. Now suppose that rather than bidding with cash, the bidders compete by offering a fraction of the future revenues. As we discuss later, it is again a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their reservation values. Alice offers 3 ⁄4 of future cash flows while Bob offers 2 ⁄3. As a result, Alice wins the auction and pays according to Bob's bid; that is, she gives up 2 ⁄3 of the future revenues. This yields a higher payoff for the auctioneer; ( 2 ⁄3) ϫ $4M ϭ $2.67M Ͼ $2M (in addition to any upfront payment).
This example is based on Robert G. Hansen (1985) , who was the first to examine the use of securities in an auction setting. Hansen showed that a second-price equity auction yields higher expected revenues than a cash-based auction. In a related paper, John G. Riley (1988) considers first-price auctions where bids include royalty payments in addition to cash. He shows that adding the royalty increases expected revenues. The intuition in both cases is that adding an equity component to the bid lowers the difference between the winner's valuation and that of the second highest bidder. Because this difference is the rent captured by the winner, reducing it benefits the seller.
In this paper, we generalize this insight along several dimensions. First, we consider a general class of securities that includes debt, equity or royalty rates, options, and hybrids of these. Second, we consider alternative auction formats (e.g., first-price versus second-price). Third, we consider informal auctions, in which the seller cannot commit to an auction mechanism in advance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The basic model is described in Section I. We begin our analysis in Section II by examining formal mechanisms, which consist of both an auction format and a security design. There we establish the following results:
• We characterize super-modularity conditions under which a monotone-and hence efficient-equilibrium is the unique outcome for the first-and second-price auctions.
• First we compare security designs holding fixed the auction format (first-or secondprice). We show that for either format, the seller's expected revenues are positively related to the "steepness" (a notion that we define) of the securities. As a result, debt contracts minimize the seller's expected payoffs while call options maximize it. This result generalizes the observations of Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988) .
• Fixing the security design, we then consider the role of the auction format. We define two important classes of sets of securities: subconvex and super-convex sets. For subconvex sets-which include, for example, the set of debt securities-we show that a second-price auction yields higher expected revenues than a first-price auction. Alternatively, if the set is super-convex (e.g., call options), the reverse conclusion holds and first-price auctions are superior. However, we find the effect of the auction format to be small relative to the security design.
• We then ask whether the Revenue Equivalence principle for cash auctions, which states that expected revenues are independent of the auction format, can be extended to securitybid auctions. We show it holds if the ordered set of securities is a convex set. This is true for important classes of securities, such as equity.
• Finally we combine these results to show that the first-price auction with call options maximizes the seller's revenue, while the firstprice format with debt minimizes it, over a general set of auction mechanisms.
In Section III, we consider the case in which the seller is unable to commit ex ante to a formal auction mechanism. Instead, he accepts all bids and chooses the security that is optimal ex post. Though often not labeled as "auctions" because they lack a formal mechanism, we believe that these informal auctions represent the vast majority of auction-like activity in practice, since in most transactions the seller is unable to commit to a decision rule ex ante. In this case, the task of selecting the winning bid is not trivial; it involves a signaling game in which the seller uses his beliefs to rank the different securities and choose the most attractive one. Our main result is as follows:
• In the unique equilibrium satisfying standard refinements of off-equilibrium beliefs, bidders use the "flattest" securities available, e.g., cash or debt. Moreover, the outcome is equivalent to a first-price auction. As a result, we conclude that this ex post maximization yields the worst possible outcome for the seller.
The intuition is that flattest security provides the cheapest way for a high type to signal his quality. Thus, bidders find it optimal to compete using these securities. Section IV extends the model by considering the effects of relaxing liquidity constraints, moral hazard regarding the bidder's investment, reservation prices, and the introduction of affiliated as well as common values. We demonstrate that the main insights of our analysis carry over to these settings. For example, we show that:
• If the bidder's investment in the project is unverifiable and subject to moral hazard, then it is not optimal for the seller to offer cash compensation to the winner for this investment.
• Combining cash payments with bids effectively "flattens" the bids and reduces the expected revenues of the seller.
• Our conclusions regarding the revenue consequences of the security design carry over to the case of affiliated values with both private and common components. The impact of auction formats is more complicated, especially with common values. We identify a new way security-bid auctions affect the winner's curse and illustrate the differences in firstand second-price auctions. Interestingly, revenue equivalence fails even with independent signals and equity bids.
Section V concludes and the Appendix contains proofs omitted in the text. Proofs of lemmas are available at http://www.e-aer.org/data/ sept05_app_demarzo.pdf.
Related Literature.-As mentioned above, Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988) first demonstrated the potential advantages of equity versus cash auctions. In a more recent paper, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and S. Viswanathan (2000) focus on first-price auctions in a setting that is similar to the model we study in the first part of the paper, and show that securities yield higher revenues than a cash-based auction. However, none of these papers provides a general means of comparing sets of nonlinear securities, as we do here. Nor do they compare auction formats or consider informal auctions. Finally, the results in Riley (1988) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) are conditional upon the existence of a separating equilibrium in which a higher type bids a higher security. For example, in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) , there always exists a pooling equilibrium and in some cases it is the unique outcome. This is because they assume that the project does not require any costly inputs-thus the lowest type can offer 100 percent of the proceeds to the seller and break even. Therefore, a low type is always willing to imitate the bid of a high type. We use a framework that is closer to Hansen (1985) , in which the project requires costly inputs. In this case, we show conditions under which the firstprice auction has a unique equilibrium, and it is separating.
One reason security-bid auctions may not have received greater attention in the literature is perhaps due to Jacques Crémer (1987) , who argues that the seller can extract the entire surplus if he can "buy" the winning bidder. Specifically, the seller can offer cash to the bidder to cover the costs of any required investment, ask all bidders to reveal their type, and award the project to the highest type while keeping 100 percent of the revenues. Initially, we rule out this solution by assuming the seller is cash constrained. Then we show in Section IV that, even if the seller is not cash constrained, Crémer's approach does not survive if the bidder's investment is not verifiable. In that case, moral hazard forces the seller to offer only compensation that is contingent on the outcome of the project.
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (2000) , Charles Z. Zheng (2001 ), Simon Board (2002 , and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2002) consider auctions with financially constrained bidders who use debt, or external financing, in their bids. Hence, while bids may be expressed in terms of cash, they are in fact contingent claims and are thus examples of the security bids that we examine here. Mark Garmaise (2001) studies a security-bid auction in the context of entrepreneurial financing. The entrepreneur commits to a probability distribution over cash flows that he will use to rank securities. He examines a common value environment and obtains a partial characterization of the equilibrium in a binary model (two bidders, two types, two values).
Other related literature includes R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1987) , who solve for the optimal mechanism in a model with a moral hazard problem. The optimal mechanism is a combination of debt and equity, with the mixture depending on the distribution of types. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1987) examine a similar model. Board (2004) analyzes selling real options to competing buyers with payments possibly conditional on exercising the option (where the exercise decision is subject to moral hazard).
We can interpret our results in a setting in which the seller needs to raise a fixed amount of cash by selling a security backed by an asset. In this case, the security sold is the complement of the winning bid, and higher auction revenues correspond to the seller raising the cash using "cheaper" securities. Thus, our result that call options are optimal is equivalent to the seller raising funds by issuing debt, with bidders competing on the loan interest rate. This result therefore extends results in the security design literature (e.g., David C. Nachman and Thomas H. Noe, 1994; DeMarzo and Darrell Duffie, 1999; DeMarzo, 2002 ) which demonstrate debt is optimal when the seller is privately informed to the case in which the bidders have superior information.
2 Similarly, our result for informal auctions suggests that when informed investors are unconstrained, they will prefer to fund the firm in exchange for equity or option-like securities.
I. The Model
There are n risk neutral bidders who compete for an asset, which we think of as the "rights to a project." The winner is required to make an investment X Ͼ 0, which we can interpret as resources required by the project, or as a minimal amount of cash the seller must raise. In either case, X is known and equal across bidders. 
The important economic assumptions contained above are, first, that the private signals of other bidders are not informative regarding the signal or payoff of bidder i. (We extend our results to allow for affiliated and/or common values in Section IV C). Second, because Z i is not bounded away from zero, the project payoff cannot be used to provide a completely riskless payment to the seller. Finally, the private signal V i is "good news" about the project payoff Z i using the standard strict version of the affiliation assumption (see Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber, 1982) .
Given the above assumptions, we normalize (without loss of generality) the private signals so that
Thus, we can interpret the signal as the NPV of the project, which we assume to be nonnegative. To simplify our analysis, we make several additional technical assumptions:
The conditional density function h(z͉v) is twice differentiable in z and v.
In addition, the functions zh(z͉v), ͉zh v (z͉v)͉ and ͉zh vv (z͉v)͉ are integrable on z ʦ (0, ϱ).
These assumptions are weak and allow us to take derivatives "through" expectation operators. An example of a setting that fits our assumptions is the payoff structure:
where the project risk is independent of V and log-normal with a mean of 1.
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The focus of this paper is on the case in which bids are securities. Bidders compete for the project by offering the seller a share of the final payoff. That is, the bids are in terms of derivative securities, in which the underlying asset is the future payoff of the project Z i . Bids can be described as function S(z), indicating the payment to the seller when the project has final payoff z. We make the following assumptions regarding the set of feasible bids 6 :
DEFINITION: A feasible security bid is described by a function S( z), such that S is weakly increasing, z Ϫ S( z) is weakly increasing, and
The set of feasible securities encompasses standard designs used in practice. However, it is not completely general. First, S( z) Յ z can be viewed as a liquidity or limited liability constraint for the bidder; only the underlying asset can be used to pay the seller. We assume, for now, that bidders do not have access to cash (or other liquid assets) that they can pledge as payment; they can transfer only property rights in the project. 7 We make this assumption in order to focus first on pure security bids and simplify the exposition. In Section IV we will generalize the setting to allow for cash payments.
Similarly, S(z) Ն 0 corresponds to a liquidity or limited liability constraint for the seller; the seller cannot commit to pay the bidder except through a share of the project payoff. For ex-ample, the seller may not have the financial resources to do so, and is selling the project to raise X. Because the seller cannot reimburse the bidder for the upfront investment, this assumption rules out a solution as in Crémer (1987) . We take this constraint as given for now, but we show in Section IV that this constraint can follow from an assumption that the bidder's investment X is not verifiable.
Finally, we require both the seller's and the bidder's payment to be weakly increasing in the payoff of the project. Monotonicity is a standard feature of almost all securities used in practice, and so is a natural constraint to consider.
8 Most importantly, without monotonicity for the bidders, equilibria would not be efficient, and without monotonicity for the seller, the seller would have incentives to choose other than the highest bid.
Together, these requirements are equivalent to S(0) ϭ 0, S is continuous, and SЈ(z) ʦ [0, 1] almost everywhere. Thus, we admit standard sets of securities, including: Given any security S, we let
denote the excepted payoff of security S conditional on the bidder having value V i ϭ v. Thus, the expected payoff to the seller if the bid S is accepted from bidder i is ES(V i ). On the other hand, the bidder's expected payoff is given by V i Ϫ ES(V i ). Thus, we can interpret V i as the independent, private value for bidder i, and ES(V i ) as the payment offered. The key difference from a standard auction, of course, is that the seller does not know the value of the bids, but only the security, S. The seller must infer the value of this security. Since the security S is monotone, the value of the security is increasing with the signal V i of the bidder, as we show below:
LEMMA 1: The value of the security ES(v) is twice differentiable. For S 0, ESЈ(v) Ͼ 0, and for S Z, ESЈ(v) Ͻ 1.
II. Formal Auctions with Ordered Securities
In many auctions, bidders compete by offering "more" of a certain security. For example, they compete by offering more debt or more equity. We begin our analysis by examining formal auctions in which the seller restricts the bids to elements of a well-ordered set of securities. Bidders compete by offering a higher security.
There are two main reasons why sellers restrict the set of securities that are admissible as bids in the auction. First, it allows them to use standard auction formats-such as first-or second-price-to allocate the object and to determine the payments. Without an imposed structure, ranking different securities is difficult and depends on the beliefs of the seller. There is no clear notion of the "highest" bid.
The second reason a seller may want to restrict the set of securities is that it can enhance revenues. We will demonstrate this result by first (in this section) studying the revenues from auctions with ordered sets of securities and then (in Section III) comparing them to the revenues from auctions in which the seller cannot commit to a restricted set and bidders can bid using any feasible security.
Example 1: Comparison of Revenues across
Securities and Auction Formats.-Before presenting the technical details of the analysis, we consider an example that illustrates our main results. Two bidders compete for a project that requires an upfront investment of X ϭ 100. The NPV of the project if run by bidder i is V i , where V i is uniform on the interval [20, 110] . The project is risky with final value Z i , which is lognormal with mean X ϩ V i and volatility of 50 percent.
Total surplus is maximized by allocating the project to the highest type, in this case leading to an expected value of E[max(V 1 , V 2 )] ϭ 80. This is the maximum expected revenue achievable by any mechanism. On the other hand, using a cash auction, the expected revenue is given by E[min(V 1 , V 2 )] ϭ 50 (which is the same for first-and second-price auctions by revenue equivalence). Table 1 shows the revenues for different security designs and auction formats.
Several observations can be made, which coincide with our main results of this section:
(a) Fixing the auction format (first-or secondprice), revenues increase moving from debt to equity to call options. In Section II B we will define a notion of "steepness" for securities and show that steeper securities lead to higher revenues, and that all security designs yield higher revenues than cash auctions. (b) The auction format is irrelevant for a cash auction and for an equity auction. While the format does make a difference for debt and call options, the rankings are reversed. In Section II C we will generalize these observations and show precisely when revenue equivalence will hold or fail. Overall, though, the impact of the auction format on revenues is minor compared to the security design. (c) Among the mechanisms examined, the firstprice auction with debt yields the lowest expected revenues, while the first-price auction with call options yields the highest expected revenues. In Section II D we shall see that these are the worst and best possible mechanisms in a broad class of security-bid auctions, and that all security-bid auctions dominate cash auctions.
A. Securities, Auctions, and Mechanisms
The first step in our analysis is to formalize the notion of an ordered set of securities. An ordered collection of securities can be defined by a function S(s, z), where s ʦ [s 0 , s 1 ] is the index of the security, and S(s, ⅐) is a feasible security. That is, S(s, z) is the payment of security s when the output of the project has value z. As before we define
For the collection of securities to be ordered, we require that its value, for any type, is increasing in s. Then, a bid of s dominates a bid of sЈ if s Ͼ sЈ. We would also like to allow for a sufficient range of bids so that for the lowest bid, every bidder earns a nonnegative profit, while for the highest bid, no bidder earns a positive profit. This leads to the following formal requirements for an ordered set of securities:
Examples of ordered sets include the sets of (levered) equity and (convertible) debt, indexed by the equity share or debt amount, and call options, indexed by the strike price. Given an ordered set of securities, it is straightforward to generalize the standard definitions of a first-and second-price auction to our setting:
First-Price Auction: Each agent submits a security. The bidder who submitted the highest Are the equilibria in these auction formats efficient? That is, does the highest value bidder win the auction? For second-price auctions the answer is straightforward; the standard characterization of the second-price auction with private values generalizes to:
LEMMA 2: The unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in the second-price auction is for a bidder i who has value V i ϭ v to submit security s (v) 
The equilibrium strategy s(v) is increasing in v.
In words, similarly to a standard second-price auction, each bidder submits bids according to his true value. We now turn our attention to the first-price auction. Incentive compatibility in the first-price auction implies that no bidder gains by mimicking another type, so that s(v) satisfies
where U(v) is the expected payoff of type v. The first-order condition of (2) then leads to a differential equation for s. However, an additional assumption is required to guarantee optimality: 
Assumption C is a joint restriction on the set of securities and the conditional distribution of Z.
10 It can be shown to hold generally in the lognormal setting (1) in the case of debt, equity, and levered equity securities with d Յ X. It can be established numerically for other types of securities, such as call options, under suitable parameter restrictions: for example, it holds in the numerical example computed earlier.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that it holds for all sets of securities under consideration.
The first-and second-price auctions are two standard auction mechanisms. They share the features that the highest bid wins, and only the winner pays. The first property is necessary for efficiency, and the second is natural in our setting, since only the winner can use the assets of the project to collateralize the payment. One can construct many other auction mechanisms, however, that share these properties. For example, one can consider third-price auctions, or auctions where the winner pays an average of the bids, etc. Below we define a broad class of mechanisms that will encompass these examples:
is a symmetric incentive compatible mechanism in which the highest type wins and pays a security chosen at random from a given set S. The randomization can depend on the realization of types, but not on the identity of the bidders (so as to be symmetric).
The first-price auction fits this description, with no randomization (the security is a function of the winner's type). In the second-price auction, the security paid depends upon the realization of the second-highest type. GSMs also allow for more complicated payment schemes that depend on all of the bids.
It will be useful in what follows to derive a basic characterization of the incentive compatibility condition for a GSM. We show that any GSM can be converted into an equivalent mechanism in which the winner pays a security that depends only on his reported type without further randomization.
LEMMA 4: Incentive compatibility in a GSM implies the existence of securities Ŝ v in the convex hull of S such that
Thus, it is equivalent to a GSM in which the winner pays the non-random security Ŝ v .
This observation will allow us to compare revenues across mechanisms by studying the relationship between the set of securities S and its convex hull.
B. Ranking Security Designs
Recall from Table 1 that the seller's revenues varied greatly with the security design. As we will show, the revenues of different designs depend upon the steepness of the securities. To do so, we need to formalize the notion of steepness of a set of securities. A simple comparison of the slopes of the securities is inadequate: comparing debt and equity, debt has higher slope for low cash flows and lower slope for high cash flows. Rather, our notion of steepness is defined by how securities cross each other. Intuitively, one security is steeper than another if it crosses that security from below. Thus, we introduce the following definition: DEFINITION: Security S 1 strictly crosses security S 2 from below if ES 1 (v*) ϭ ES 2 (v*) implies ESЈ 1 (v*) Ͼ ESЈ 2 (v*). An ordered set of securities S 1 is steeper than an ordered set S 2 if for all S 1 ʦ S 1 and S 2 ʦ S 2 , S 1 strictly crosses S 2 from below.
The following useful lemma shows that steepness is naturally related to the shape of the underlying securities-if the payoffs of the securities cross from below, then their expected payoffs strictly cross:
LEMMA 5 (Single crossing): A sufficient condition for S 1 to strictly cross S 2 from below is that S 1 S 2 , and there exists z* such that S 1 (z) Յ S 2 (z) for z Ͻ z* and S 1 (z) Ն S 2 (z) for z Ͼ z*.
Comparing standard securities, note that a call option is steeper than equity, which in turn is steeper than debt. See Figure 1 .
Why is steepness related to auction revenues? Consider a second-price auction, where the winning bidder with type V 1 pays the security bid by the second highest type V 2 . That is, the winner pays ES(s(V 2 ), V 1 ). Since bidders bid their reservation value in a second-price auction, ES(s(V 2 ), V 2 ) ϭ V 2 . Hence, the security design impacts revenues only through the difference
which is just the sensitivity of the security to the true type. So to compare two securities we need to compare their slopes where the expected payments are the same and equal to V 2 . By our definition, steeper securities are more sensitive at the crossing point, and so lead to higher revenues. More generally, steepness enhances competition between bidders since even with the same bid, a higher type will pay more. This is the essence of the Linkage Principle, first used by Milgrom and Weber (1982) to rank auction formats for cash auctions when types are affiliated.
12 Applying the envelope theorem to the incentive condition (2) for a first-price auction, we get
To compare expected revenues in (efficient) auctions with different sets of securities, it is sufficient to rank expected payoffs of bidders. If ES 2 (s, v) are ranked for every s and v, then UЈ(v) are ranked and hence so are U(v) (using the boundary condition U(v L ) ϭ 0). In general, we cannot rank ES 2 (s, v) everywhere, but it is sufficient to rank ES 2 (s, v) at securities with the same expected payments. Our definition of steepness again captures that ranking. This leads to the following main result: PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the ordered set of securities S 1 is steeper than S 2 . Then for either a first or second-price auction, for any realization of types, the seller's revenues are higher using S 1 than using S 2 .
As a result, flat securities, like debt, lead to low expected revenues, and steep securities, like call options, lead to high expected revenues. In fact, since debt and call options are the flattest 13 and steepest possible securities, they represent the worst and best designs for the seller. We can also extend the logic of Proposition 1 to cash auctions, as a cash bid is flatter than any security. Note that in all cases, these rankings are for any realization of types, and hence are stronger than the usual comparison based on an expectation over types.
C. Ranking Auction Formats
In our setting of symmetric independent private values and risk neutrality, a wellknown and important result for cash auctions is the Revenue Equivalence Principle. It implies that the choice of the auction format is irrelevant when the ultimate allocation is efficient.
14 We now turn to examining the revenue consequences of the choice of auction format in a security-bid auction. As we have seen from the numerical analysis of Example 1 in Table 1 , revenue equivalence seems to hold for some security designs but not for others. To develop some further intuition, we begin with two simple examples.
Example 2: Equity Auctions and Revenue
Equivalence.-There are two bidders with independent types V i distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Upfront investment is X ϭ 1. The distribution of Z i has full support with mean X ϩ V i .
Consider a second-price equity auction. As we know, it is a dominant strategy to bid the reservation value:
, which is increasing in v. In a first-price auction it is an equilibrium strategy for agents to bid
, which is also increasing.
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Now observe that both auctions yield equal payoffs to the auctioneer, as in both auction formats the highest type wins and the average losing bid in a second-price auction equals the highest bid in the first-price auction:
12 See also Vijay Krishna (2002) . The linkage principle is typically used to compare formats when signals are affiliated. In security-bid auctions, unlike cash auctions, even with independent types the winner's expected payment depends on his true type, as pointed out by Riley (1988) in the context of royalty rates.
13 By flattest, we mean that all other sets of securities are steeper.
14 William Vickrey (1961) , Roger B. Myerson (1981) , Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981) . 15 The payoff of a type v who pretends to be vЈ is
which is maximized by setting v Ј ϭ v, verifying an equilibrium.
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While in this example revenue equivalence holds, as the next example shows this is not the case for all securities. 16 If a bidder wins and pays according to a debt bid with face value b, the payoff to the seller is min(b, z), which for a type v yields on average:
In a second-price auction it is an equilibrium strategy for agents to bid their reservation values: b SPA (v) ϭ 2v. In a first-price auction it is an equilibrium strategy to bid b FPA (v) ϭ 2 ⁄3 v.
17
Suppose bidder 1 wins the auction. In a firstprice auction, his payoff is
while in a second-price auction, his payoff is
We conclude that bidders' welfare is higher in the first-price auction and, since in both auction formats the highest type wins, revenues are higher in the second-price auction. Thus, revenue equivalence fails.
To gain some insight into why revenue equivalence fails, note that in the second-price auction, the winner pays a random security (determined by the second highest bid). The winner's payment is equivalent to paying the "expected security"
in a first-price auction. 18 This security is not a debt security, and therefore is steeper than debt.
19 As a result of this steepness, the seller's revenues are enhanced. On the other hand, in the case of equity, a convex combination of securities is also an equity security. Thus, there is no change in steepness, and so no change in revenues.
Sub-and Super-Convex Sets of Securities.-
The previous examples suggest that the revenue differences across auction formats will stem from the differences in steepness between the set of securities and its convex hull. This motivates the following formal classification: 16 While this example violates some of our technical assumptions (X Ͼ 0 and Z has full support), it provides a simple closed-form solution (and suggests that our results are more general). We thank a referee for this example.
17 To verify that this is an equilibrium, note from (4) that the payoff of a type v who pretends to be vЈ is vЈ[(2v Ϫ 2vЈ/3) 2 /4v], which is maximized for vЈ ϭ v. 18 In this example the support of Z 1 is bounded by 2v 1 , so the security is monotone. Note that the bidder's expected payoff with this security is
, as before. 19 In general, a convex combination of debt securities is steeper than debt. For example, a 50-50 mix of debt with face value 50 and face value 100 has slope 1 ⁄2 for z ʦ (50, 100), and so crosses debt from below. 20 A nontrivial convex combination puts positive weight on more than one security.
Not every set falls into one of the categories above. Still, there are some important examples of sub-and super-convex sets:
LEMMA 6: The set of standard debt contracts is sub-convex. The set of convertible debt contracts indexed by the equity share ␣, the set of levered equity contracts indexed by leverage, and call options are super-convex sets.
Based on the characterization above, we can again use the Linkage Principle to rank the expected revenues of first-and second-price auctions. Here the proof relies on Lemma 4, which allows us to interpret the second-price format as a first-price mechanism in the convex hull of the set of securities:
PROPOSITION 2: If the ordered set of securities is sub-convex, then the first-price auction yields lower expected revenues than the secondprice auction. If the ordered set of securities is super-convex, the first-price auction yields higher expected revenues than the second-price auction. (This revenue comparison also holds conditional on the winner's type, for all but the lowest type.)
One subtlety in the proof of Proposition 2 is that the security paid by the lowest type is the same for both auction formats (and is defined by the zero-profit condition). Thus, neither format employs a "steeper" security for that type. We get around this problem by slightly perturbing the support of the types for one of the auction formats, comparing revenues, and taking the limit.
Proposition 2 reveals that the auction format can have an impact on revenues. As we have seen, however, this revenue impact stems from the difference in steepness between the set of securities and their convex hull. This difference is always less extreme than the difference in steepness that can be obtained by changing the security design directly. In that sense, the design of the securities is much more important than the design of the auction format in determining revenues.
Revenue Equivalence for Convex Sets of Securities.-While revenue equivalence does not hold for general security auctions, it does hold for cash, and holds for equity in our examples.
Here we ask whether it can be recovered for some classes of securities-that is, what is special about cash?
From Proposition 2, revenue equivalence fails in one direction for a super-convex set, and in the opposite direction for a sub-convex set. Hence, a natural candidate is a set in the middle, i.e., a convex set:
DEFINITION: An ordered set of securities S is convex if it is equal to its convex hull.
In fact, convex sets of securities have a simple characterization-each security is a convex combination of the lowest security s 0 and the highest security s 1 . Thus, each security can be thought of as s 0 plus some "equity shares" of the security (s 1 Ϫ s 0 ), and so it can be thought of as a generalization of a standard equity auction. Our main result in this section is that under convexity, the Revenue Equivalence holds.
PROPOSITION 3 (Revenue equivalence): Every efficient equilibrium of a GSM with securities from an ordered convex set yields the same expected revenues. (This equivalence also holds conditional on the winner's type.)
Note that this is a stronger statement than equivalence between a first-and second-price auction, as it holds for any symmetric mechanism. Also note that the standard envelope argument behind Revenue Equivalence does not extend directly to security auctions. For cash, there is no linkage between the true type and the bidder's expected payment when types are independent, so revenues depend only upon the allocation. 21 That is not the case with security bids, as we have seen. However, when the security set is convex, because paying a random security is equivalent to paying the expected security drawn from the same set, the expected linkage across all mechanisms is identical.
D. Best and Worst Mechanisms
We can combine the results of the previous two sections to determine the best and worst security design and format combinations. Note 21 That is, in the case of cash auctions, (3) reduces to
that, since debt is a sub-convex set, from Proposition 2 the first-price auction is inferior to the second-price auction, and conversely for call options, which are super-convex. The following proposition establishes that a first-price auction with debt and with call options provides lower and upper bounds for the seller's revenue across a broad class of mechanisms.
PROPOSITION 4: A first-price auction with call options yields the highest expected revenues among all general symmetric mechanisms. A first-price auction with standard debt yields the lowest expected revenues among all general symmetric mechanisms.
Proposition 4 establishes that the design of the security is more important than the specific auction format: the revenue consequences of shifting from debt to call options in a first-price auction exceeds the consequences of any change in the auction mechanism.
We remark that Proposition 4 is stated with respect to the particular set of feasible securities we have allowed thus far. It can be extended in the obvious way: for any feasible set, if there is a steepest set of securities which is (super-) convex, then a (first-price) auction using this set yields the highest possible revenues. Similarly, if there is a flattest set which is (sub-)convex, then a (first-price) auction using this set yields the lowest possible revenues.
For example, if bidders can pay cash, a cash auction is the worst possible auction for the seller. This is because cash, which is insensitive to type, is even flatter than standard debt securities. Alternatively, the seller may be able to increase revenues by using securities that are even more leveraged than call options. For example, the seller might pay the bidder cash for additional equity. (See Section IV A for a further discussion of this case.)
III. Informal Auctions: The Signaling Game
In the previous section we considered formal auctions in which bidders are restricted to choose securities from a specific well-ordered set. In reality, there is often no such restriction. That is, the seller is unable to commit to ignore offers that are outside the set. As a result, the seller will consider all bids, choosing the most attractive bid ex post. In this case, the "security design" is in the hands of the bidders, who can choose to bid using any feasible security.
Without the structure of a well-ordered set, once the bids are submitted there is no obvious notion of a "highest" bid. In this case, the seller faces the task of choosing one of the submitted bids. Since there is no ex ante commitment by the seller to a decision rule, the seller will choose the winning bid that offers the highest expected payoff. Since the payoff of the security depends on the bidder's type, the seller's choice may depend upon his beliefs regarding the bid each type submits in equilibrium. Thus, this setting has the features of a signaling game that takes the form: We consider a sequential equilibrium of this game. We argue that in the informal auctions, bidders will choose the flattest securities possible. That is, they will bid with cash, if it is feasible; otherwise, they will bid with debt. Thus, Proposition 4 implies that the seller's expected revenues are the lowest possible from any general auction mechanism.
To gain some insight, consider first a case in which bidders can use cash. We argue that in equilibrium bidders use only cash. The intuition for this result is as follows. Let S v be the security bid by type v. When a bidder of type v decides on his bid, he has the option to mimic other types. In particular, he can mimic a type vЈ ϭ v Ϫ dv just below him. Such a deviation has two effects. First, it will reduce his probability of winning to that of type vЈ. Second, it will lower his expected payment if he wins from ES v (v) to ES v Ј (v). On the margin, these two effects must balance out (otherwise there is a profitable deviation).
But now suppose types just below v use security bids rather than cash. Consider the deviation by type v to a cash bid of amount b(vЈ) ϭ ES v Ј (vЈ). Since the seller values this cash bid the same as the bid S v Ј by type vЈ, the marginal effect on the probability of winning is the same as if he deviates to S v Ј . However, because the expected value of the security is increasing in the true type, the expected payment is b(vЈ) ϭ
. Thus, if type v is indifferent to a deviation using securities, he will profit from a deviation using cash. As a result, an equilibrium will involve only cash bids.
The second step of the logic above can be applied even when cash bids are not available. When mimicking a lower type, it is cheaper for a higher type to use a security that is less sensitive to the true type-i.e., a flatter securitythan that used in the proposed equilibrium. This reasoning suggests an equilibrium will involve the flattest securities available.
However, there is a difficulty with extending this result when cash is not available. The gain from a deviation depends crucially on the seller's evaluation of the bid. The argument we gave above is simplified by the fact that the value of a cash bid is unambiguous; the seller does not need to rely on his beliefs. But when bidders do not use cash, the value of any offequilibrium bid depends on the seller's offequilibrium beliefs. As with general signaling games, there are many equilibria of this game if we do not impose any restrictions on the beliefs of the seller when an "unexpected" bid is observed. 22 We turn to such restrictions next.
A. Refining Beliefs: The D1 Criterion
To rule out equilibria supported with arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs, the standard refinement in the signaling literature is the notion of strategic stability, introduced by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens (1986). For our purposes, a weaker refinement, known as D1, is sufficient to identify a unique equilibrium.
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The D1 refinement (see In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps, 1987; Cho and Joel Sobel, 1990 ) is a refinement commonly used in the security design literature. 24 Intuitively, the D1 refinement criterion requires that if the seller observes an out-of-equilibrium bid, the seller should believe the bid came from the type "most eager" to make the deviation.
In order to define the D1 criterion in our context, we introduce the following notation. First, let S i be the random variable representing the security bid by bidder i, which will depend on V i . For any feasible security S, let R i (S) be the scoring rule assigned by the seller, representing the expected revenues the seller anticipates from that security, given his beliefs. Along the equilibrium path, the seller's beliefs are correct, so that the scoring rule satisfies
Given the seller's scoring rule, R i , it must also be the case in equilibrium that bidders are bidding optimally. That is, conditional on
where P i (r) is the probability that r is the highest score. 25 Thus, U i (v) is the equilibrium expected payoff for bidder i with type v.
Suppose the seller observes an out-ofequilibrium bid, so that the score is not determined by (5). Which types would be most likely to gain from such a bid? For each type v, we can determine the minimum probability of winning, B i (S, v) , that would make bidding S attractive:
Then the D1 criterion requires that the seller believe that a deviation to security S came from the types which would find S attractive for the lowest probability of winning 26 :
Thus, a sequential equilibrium satisfying the D1 criterion for the auction game can be described by scoring rules R i and bidding strategy S i for all i satisfying (5)- (7). 22 If the seller believes all off-equilibrium bids are made by the lowest type, the gain from deviating is minimized. These beliefs seem unreasonable, however, since many securities would be unprofitable for the lowest type. 23 Strictly speaking, D1 is defined for discrete type spaces. However, it can be naturally extended to continuous types (see, e.g., Garey Ramey, 1996) . 24 See, e.g., Nachman and Noe (1994) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999). 25 If there are ties, we require that P i be consistent with some tie-breaking rule. 26 We have economized on notation here. If the set of minimizers is not unique, the score is in the convex hull of ES(v) for v in the set of minimizers.
B. Equilibrium Characterization
Using the D1 refinement, we can now extend the argument we made for cash deviations to other securities. Suppose type v mimics type vЈ ϭ v Ϫ dv. The cost of doing so for type v is ES v Ј (v). Now suppose v instead deviates to a security S that is flatter than S v Ј and such that ES(vЈ) ϭ ES v Ј (vЈ). Because the security is flatter, it has a lower cost for type v, ES(v) Ͻ ES v Ј (v). How would the seller respond to the deviation S?
Because S is flatter than S v Ј , it is a more expensive security for types below vЈ, and cheaper for types above vЈ, than S v Ј . Therefore, the types that are "most eager" to deviate to S must be above vЈ. By D1, this implies that the seller will evaluate S as at least as valuable as S v Ј . Therefore, if type v is indifferent to a deviation to S v Ј , he will profit from a deviation to a flatter security S. As a result, an equilibrium will involve only the flattest possible securities.
We now proceed with a formal statement of our results. As is standard in the auction setting, we will focus on symmetric equilibria. 27 We maintain Assumption C for the flattest securities, so that existence of an efficient equilibrium of the first-price auction is assured. Then we have:
PROPOSITION 5: Given symmetric strategies, there is a unique equilibrium of the informal auction satisfying D1. This equilibrium is equivalent, in both payoffs and strategies, to the equilibrium of a first-price auction in which players bid with the flattest securities feasible. In particular, if they can bid with cash, they will use only cash; if cash is not feasible, they will bid with standard debt contracts.
Again, we can now combine this result with the result of the previous section to formalize the value of the seller's ability to commit to a restricted set of securities.
COROLLARY: If the seller can commit to a formal auction with an ordered set of securities other than debt contracts, then expected revenues are higher than without such commitment.
PROOF:
Follows immediately from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
IV. Extensions

A. Relaxing the Liquidity Constraints
We have assumed that both the seller and the bidders are liquidity constrained. We now explore implications of either the seller or bidders having access to cash.
Moral Hazard: Non-Contractible Investment.-The main setting for our model is the case in which the seller is liquidity constrained; indeed, we can interpret X as an amount of cash the seller must raise. But if X corresponds to resources required for the project, and if the seller has surplus cash, securities in which the seller reimburses the winner for a portion of the initial investment (and thus have S(0) Ͻ 0) are feasible. Importantly, these securities can be steeper than call options and so increase revenues. For example, the seller could auction off the rights to a fraction of the cash flows and reimburse the winner directly for the investment (1 Ϫ ) X. By making arbitrarily small, the seller can extract the entire surplus. While this theoretical mechanism was proposed by Crémer (1987) , it is not observed in practice. A likely reason is moral hazard: if the winner's investment is not fully contractible, and if the winner receives only a small fraction of future revenues, then he may underinvest.
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For example, suppose that after the auction the winning bidder i can choose whether to invest X. If X is invested, the payoff of the project is Z i as before, and his payment to the seller is S(Z i ). If X is not invested, the payoff is 0, and his payment to the seller is S(0). If S(0) Ն 0, the bidder's payoff is nonpositive without investment, and so the op-tion not to invest is irrelevant. But suppose a bid with S(0) Ͻ 0 is accepted with positive probability. Then every bidder, including the lowest type, can earn positive profits by making such a bid and not investing. Yet if bidders do not invest and S(0) Ͻ 0, the seller loses money. As a result, the seller would choose not to accept such securities, as shown below: Thus, when X is not contractible, even if the seller has cash we can rule out reimbursement from the seller: it would either not occur in equilibrium or not be in the seller's best interest.
Partial Cash Bids.-Suppose bidders have cash equal to B, where B is known and common to all bidders. 29 Cash relaxes the limited liability restriction for bidders so that the flattest securities are now debt claims on the total assets of the bidder (cash ϩ project), defined by
As the decomposition above reveals, we can think of this security as an immediate cash payment (up to B), plus a standard debt claim on the project (for amounts above B). Because these securities become flatter as B increases, the seller's expected revenues decrease with B.
A pure cash auction, yielding the lowest possible revenues, is possible for a second-price auction if B exceeds v H , and for a first-price auction if B exceeds the expected maximum type for n Ϫ 1 bidders (which is less than v H ). Thus, a first-price auction yields lower revenues for the seller as long as B Ͻ v H . These results are consistent with Board (2002) , who considers debt auctions and shows that they yield higher revenues than cash auctions, with the smallest effect for first-price auctions.
B. Reservation Prices
In this section we discuss briefly how reservation prices can be incorporated into our analysis. Commitment to a reservation price can improve the seller's revenues, and even absent commitment, a reservation price may be relevant if selling the project entails an opportunity cost.
In the case of formal auctions, we assumed earlier that the lowest security, s 0 , was such that all types earn nonnegative profits; that is,
A reservation price is equivalent to assuming that s 0 restricts that set of types that can profitably participate. In particular, if we choose s 0 so that
, then v r is the reservation price, and types below v r will not be allocated the project. All of our results generalize to this case. In case of informal auctions, since there is no commitment, we interpret v r as the outside opportunity for the seller.
C. Affiliated Private and Common Values
Our model thus far is based on the classic independent private values framework. We discuss here how our results generalize when values are affiliated (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982) and may have common, as well as private, components. 30 Formally we assume that: First we consider formal auctions with a fixed auction format. Under appropriate conditions there exists a unique symmetric increasing equilibrium for both the first-and the second-price auction.
31 Given an efficient equilibrium, we can generalize our result regarding the impact of the security design on the seller's revenues 32 :
• Given a symmetric increasing equilibrium, then fixing the mechanism (first-or secondprice), steeper sets of securities yield higher revenues for the seller.
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The intuition for this result is the same as before-steeper securities increase the effective competition between bidders since they are more costly for higher types. What about the comparison of auction formats? Here it is useful to consider first the case of affiliated private values (i.e., h(z͉v i , v Ϫi ) does not depend on v Ϫi ). In this setting, revenue equivalence fails even for cash auctions, as shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . In our setting:
• With affiliated private values, for both convex and sub-convex sets of securities, secondprice auctions generate higher expected revenues than first-price auctions.
This result again follows from the linkage principle, since the second-highest bid is affiliated with, or "linked" to, the winner's value. This linkage creates an advantage for the second-price auction.
On the other hand, if there is a common value component to the asset, this can have an opposing effect regarding the optimal auction format, and create an advantage for a first-price auction. We show this below for a case of independent signals and common value:
• Suppose V i are independent, and E[Z i ͉V] ϭ ¥ j V j . 34 Then for an equity auction, the first-price auction generates higher expected revenues than a second-price auction.
The intuition for this result is that, since the equity-share is increasing with the bidder's type, and therefore correlated with the asset's value, to generate the same expected revenues the expected equity-share in the second-price auction is lower than in the first-price auction. But the lower average equity share reduces the linkage to the winner's own type, reducing revenues in the second-price auction.
Finally, consider the setting of an informal auction. With affiliated private values, our conclusions regarding the informal auction holdhigh types prefer to use flat securities to separate from lower types:
• In the unique D1 equilibrium, bidders use the flattest possible securities leading to the lowest revenues for the seller.
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With common values the signaling game becomes much more complex. Now, after observing the bids, the seller is potentially more informed than the bidder. Thus the bidder faces an adverse selection problem. This adverse selection is mitigated by making the seller's payoff sensitive to revenues, potentially leading bidders to bid using steeper securities. We leave the analysis of this case for future research.
the expectation of any monotone function of the variables. With two random variables, it is equivalent to the MLRP. 31 For a second-price auction we do not need extra conditions. For a first-price auction, we again need log-supermodularity of the winner's profit, which becomes more complicated in this case.
32 See Appendix for proofs. 33 In this case, the notion of steepness is that given in Lemma 5, which, combined with affiliation, will imply that securities strictly cross in terms of their expected costs.
V. Conclusion
We have examined an aspect of bidding relatively ignored in auction theory-the fact that bidders' payments often depend on the realization of future cash flows. This embeds a security design problem within the auction setting. First we analyzed formal auctions in which the seller chooses the security design and restricts bidders to bid only using securities in an ordered set. This enables a simple ranking of the securities and the use of standard auction formats. We showed conditions for which Revenue Equivalence holds, and determined the optimal and worst format and security design combinations. In particular, we showed that revenues are increasing in the steepness of the securities, and demonstrated that the first-price debt auction yields the lowest revenues, whereas a first-price auction with call options yields the highest revenues, across a broad class of possible mechanisms.
Next, we considered informal auctions in which the seller does not restrict the set of securities or the mechanism ex ante, but chooses the most attractive bid ex post. In this case, security design is in the hands of the bidders. We show that this yields the lowest possible expected revenues for the seller, and is equivalent to a first-price auction using the flattest feasible securities, such as debt or cash. Thus, there are strong incentives for the seller to be actively involved in the auction design and select the securities that can be used.
Finally, we generalized our results to include relaxed liquidity constraints (incorporating aspects of moral hazard), partial cash bids, reservation prices, and affiliated and common values. All of our main insights and results are robust to these features.
There are a number of natural extensions to our framework. For example, the role of the security design often extends beyond the auction to determine the winner's and seller's incentives ex post. While we discuss a simple moral hazard setting in Section IV A, more general settings can be considered. Some of these can be modeled as further restrictions on the set of feasible securities. For example, consider the case in which the winner has the opportunity to divert cash flows from the project, with each dollar diverted generating a private payoff of ␦ Ͻ 1. In this case, by the usual revelation principle argument, we can restrict attention to securities that do not induce diversion, i.e., such that 1 Ϫ SЈ(z) Ն ␦. Because this limits the steepness of the security, it lowers the revenues the seller can achieve using the optimal formal auction. On the other hand, it also rules out debt. So if bidders are cash constrained, the flattest possible securities have the form S(d, z) ϭ min(d, (1 Ϫ ␦)z). Because these securities are not as flat as standard debt, the revenues of the seller are in fact enhanced by this restriction.
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More generally, our analysis provides clear intuition for the way in which moral hazard concerns will interact with competition and revenues in the auction. For example, if the revenues of the project are costly to verify, we know from Robert Townsend (1979) that it is optimal for the party who observes the cash flows to be the residual claimant. Thus, if the seller observes the cash flows, the optimal agency contract is a call option, which also maximizes the auction revenues. If the winner observes the cash flows, there is a tradeoff between verification costs, which are minimized with debt securities, and auction revenues.
For mergers and acquisitions, tax implications and accounting treatment are likely to be important. For example, the deferral of taxes possible with an equity-based transaction may give rise to the use of equity bids even in an unrestricted setting. Our results imply that this tax preference can also lead to enhanced revenues for the seller.
It would be useful to allow for more complicated information structures. For example, bidders may have private information not only about V but also about X, or the seller may have private information. Another extension of our model that would be useful in applications would be to allow for asymmetries in bidders' valuations and costs. One difficulty is that in such a setting, it may be impossible to ensure an efficient outcome (see, for example, recent work 36 Similarly, if the seller can divert cash flows, the constraint becomes SЈ(z) Ն ␦, which rules out cash or debt and enhances revenues in an informal auction. Other moral hazard settings can also be considered. If the winner can add arbitrary risk (see, e.g., S. Abraham Ravid and Matthew I. Spiegel, 1997), then bidders are restricted to using convex securities. See also Samuelson (1987) for a discussion of other potential constraints on the security design.
by Sandro Brusco et al., 2004 , in the context of mergers).
APPENDIX
Proofs of all technical lemmas are available from the AER Web Appendix. We provide here the proofs of all propositions in the text.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
The reasoning for the second-price auction was provided in the text. For the first-price auction, let U j (v) be the equilibrium payoff for type v, and S v j the security bid, with the set S j .
Thus, from the envelope condition,
Ј͑v͒.
Since bidders' payoffs are lower, the seller's expected revenue is higher for each realization of the winning type under S 1 .
PROOF OF COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 1:
Since debt has slope 1 and then 0, it strictly crosses any other nondebt security from above. Call options have slope 0 and then 1, and so strictly cross any other nonoption security from below. The result then follows directly from Proposition 1.
What about the comparison of debt securities to other sets that may include debt? The proof for second-price auctions is unchanged. But for first-price auctions, we have the minor difficulty that a debt security does not strictly cross another debt security. In that case we modify the set of debt securities by adding in cash, i.e., the security payoff is S( z) ϭ min ( z, d) ϩ . This set strictly crosses any other set from above, and so the revenues can be ranked as in Proposition 1. The result then follows from the continuity of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the first-price auction as we take the limit as 3 0. We can do the same for call options by subtracting cash from each security.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Consider the direct revelation game corresponding to the two auctions. Let S v 1 be the security bid in the first-price auction, and let S v 2 be the expected security payment in the secondprice auction for a winner with type v, defined as in Lemma 4. Then, if the set of securities is super-convex, S v 1 crosses S v 2 from below, and a nearly identical argument to that used in the proof of Proposition 1 for first-price auctions can be applied to prove that the seller's expected revenues are higher in the first-price auction.
The only complication is that the securities issued by the lowest types are identical in the first-and second-price auctions, so that the securities do not strictly cross and 
, and by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1,
Then by the continuity of the strategies and payoffs in the boundary of the support v L ϩ , the first-price auction has weakly higher revenues. However, since the securities strictly cross for higher types, the revenues cannot be equal.
The proof for sub-convex sets is identical, with the inequalities reversed (and taking the limit of the support for the second-price auction).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
In a GSM, the winner pays according to a random security. From Lemma 4, the expected payment by type v reporting vЈ can be written as EŜ v Ј (v), where Ŝ v Ј is in the convex hull of the ordered set of securities S. Since S is convex, we can define s*(vЈ) such that
Because S is ordered, incentive compatibility implies s*(v) must be increasing; otherwise a bidder could raise the probability of winning without increasing the expected payment. Thus, s*(v) defines an efficient equilibrium for the first-price auction. The result then follows from the uniqueness of equilibrium in the first-price auction.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
The proof follows that of Proposition 2, except that instead of the second-price auction we consider a general symmetric mechanism over some subset of the feasible securities. The result follows, as a call option contract is steeper and a standard debt contract is flatter than any convex combination of feasible securities (where we use the same trick as in the proof of the Corollary to Proposition 1 if the sets of securities intersect).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
We focus on the no-cash case, as the argument with cash is similar (and even simpler as off-equilibrium beliefs do not play any major role). In step 1, we show existence of a debtbased equilibrium that survives the D1 refinement. In steps 2 and 3, we show that no other equilibrium exists. In step 2, we prove that any equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium of a first-price auction in debt contracts. In step 3, we use the envelope condition to argue that the securities used in the original equilibrium must have been debt as well.
The proof differs somewhat from the intuition in the text, which considers deviations by type v to mimic type vЈ ϭ v Ϫ dv. This "local deviation" is more intuitive but is not precise since types are not discrete and therefore there is no nearby type vЈ that type v is truly indifferent toward mimicking.
Step 1: The equilibrium from a first-price debt auction is a D1 equilibrium in the unrestricted auction (with appropriate off-equilibrium beliefs).
We need to demonstrate that given the strategies from the debt auction, there is a set of beliefs satisfying D1 that support this equilibrium in the unrestricted auction. We construct the beliefs R using (5) and (7). If (7) does not produce a unique score, we can choose the lowest one. We now show that this supports the equilibrium.
Step 1a: For debt contracts, the score is increasing in the face value of the debt. Because the objective function is strictly logsupermodular by Assumption C, from Donald M. Topkis (1978) we know that v is weakly increasing with d. Thus, (7) implies R(S d ) is increasing in d.
Step 1b: R supports an equilibrium in the unrestricted auction.
Consider any deviation to a debt contract. From
Step 1a, the probability of winning the auction is the same as in a first-price auction. Since we have a first-price equilibrium, there is no gain to the deviation. Consider a deviation to a nondebt contract S. To show it is not profitable for any type, we must show that P(R(S)) Յ min v B (S, v) . Let v be the highest type in the set that minimizes B (S, v) . Then ES(v) Ն R(S). It is sufficient to show that type v does not find the deviation to S profitable, i.e., to show that P(R(S)) Յ B (S, v) . Thus, if a deviation to S is profitable, so is a deviation to S d . But this contradicts the fact that no deviation to a debt contract is profitable.
Step 2: A symmetric D1 equilibrium in the unrestricted auction has the same payoffs as the equilibrium of a first-price debt auction.
Our method of proof is to show that any nondebt bids can be replaced with an equivalent debt bid without changing the equilibrium.
Step 2a: If S is not a debt contract, then at most one type uses this security.
Suppose not, so that v 1 Ͻ v 2 are the lowest and highest types that use S. Then, by (5) d(v) has the same payoff as bidding S, and so is also optimal for type v. Because S is an equilibrium bid, P(R (S d(v) )) Յ P(R(S)) by (6). However, by the same argument used in the previous step, lower types find S d(v) more costly than S so that B (S d(v) , vЈ) Ͼ P(R(S)) for vЈ Ͻ v. Hence, R (S d(v) ) Ն ES d(v) (v) ϭ R(S). Thus, P(R (S d(v) )) ϭ P(R(S)). The result follows since the cost and probability of acceptance of bidding debt with face value d(v) and bidding S are the same for type v.
Step 2c: d(v) is the unique symmetric equilibrium for a first-price debt auction and it is increasing. From Step 2b, bidding debt d(v) is optimal and so solves
Using the same logic as in step 1a, R(S d ) is increasing in d. Therefore, this maximization problem is identical to the problem faced by bidders in a debt-only first-price auction. Uniqueness and monotonicity follow from Lemma 3.
Step 3: In a symmetric D1 equilibrium in the unrestricted auction, almost every bid is a debt contract. From Step 2 and Lemma 3, the equilibrium payoff of type v in the first-price auction with debt is
and U is differentiable. Suppose v ʦ (v L , v H ) bids S in equilibrium. By a standard envelope argument,
UЈ͑v͒ ϭ F n Ϫ 1 ͑v͒͑1 Ϫ ESЈ͑v͒͒. d(v)Ј (v) . Therefore by Lemma 5, S ϭ S d(v) .
Thus, ES(v) ϭ ES d(v)
(v) and ESЈ(v) ϭ ES
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Case 1: First-and second-price auctions
Let sЈ be a bid that wins with positive probability such that S(sЈ, 0) Ͻ 0. Due to the moral hazard problem, submitting this bid earns strictly positive profits for any type, since any type can simply not invest and collect ϪS(sЈ, 0) in a first-price auction, or even more in a second-price auction (since the second highest bid is below sЈ). Thus, by incentive compatibility, all equilibrium bids earn positive profits. Let s គ be the lowest bid submitted. Then the above implies this bid must win with positive probability. Since it is the lowest bid, this implies a tie-that is, s គ is submitted with positive probability. But then raising the bid slightly would lead to a discrete jump in the probability of winning and hence in profits. Incentive compatibility therefore implies s គ ϭ s 1 , the highest possible bid. If S(s 1 , 0) Ն 0, this contradicts the existence of sЈ. If S(s 1 , 0) Ͻ 0, then all types bid s 1 . But at s 1 , all types lose money if they run the project. Therefore, all types bid s 1 , do not invest, and collect ϪS(s 1 , 0) Ͼ 0 from the seller.
Case 2: General mechanisms
In an efficient mechanism, the lowest type wins with zero probability and so earns zero expected profits. Since lowest type can claim to be any type and not invest, it must be the case that no type with positive probability of winning pays a security with S(0) Ͻ 0 with positive probability.
Case 3: Informal auctions
Here the result follows immediately from our result that an equilibrium will always use the flattest possible securities. If S(0) Ͻ 0, we can "flatten" the security by raising S(0) and flattening it elsewhere.
PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION IV C:
Result 1: Consider a first-price auction and two sets of securities A and B where A is steeper than B. Let S v A and S v B be the equilibrium bid
